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Contributors to this forum are invited to write from their own disciplinary perspective 
on exciting intellectual developments in their field and to assess their implications for 
contemporary political economy. They should also address how far political economy 
is (or should become) an interdisciplinary venture. We find it hard to answer these 
questions, however, because neither co-author identifies with a single discipline. 
Indeed, we reject the discursive and organizational construction (and, worse, the 
fetishization) of disciplinary boundaries. This means in turn that we cannot describe 
our approach as inter- or multi-disciplinary in its aspiration -- even though, faute de 
mieux, we draw on concepts, theoretical arguments, and empirical studies written 
from existing disciplinary perspectives. Instead, we describe our shared approach as 
pre-disciplinary in its historical inspiration and as post-disciplinary in its current 
intellectual implications. We are not alone in refusing disciplinary boundaries and 
decrying some of their effects. Indeed, among the most exciting recent intellectual 
developments in the social sciences is the increasing commitment to transcending 
these boundaries to better understand the complex interconnections within and 
across the natural and social worlds. Thus our own forum contribution seeks to bring 
out some implications of pre- and post-disciplinary analyses of political economy. We 
advocate the idea of a 'cultural political economy' and suggest how it might transform 
understandings of recent developments in political economy. 
 
Exciting Intellectual Developments 
 
We can classify these into three broad groups. The first is rooted in the gradual 
decomposition and/or continuing crisis of orthodox disciplines and is reflected in the 
rise of new transdisciplinary fields of study and a commitment to post-disciplinarity. 
This is reflected in growing critical interest in the history of the social sciences, their 
grounding in Enlightenment thought, their links to state formation in Europe and the 
USA as well as to capitalist economic development, and their differential articulation 
to modernity.2 It is linked to increasing interest in such issues and perspectives as 
the situatedness of social science knowledge; post-colonialism as topic and method; 
and the challenges to received paradigms from 'post-modernity'. It is also seen in the 
growth of 'cultural studies' as one of the most innovative trans- or post-disciplinary 
fields of inquiry and its major role in re-connecting the humanities and social 
sciences; and, more important for our purposes, in the so-called 'cultural turn', 
broadly understood, in many more orthodox disciplines (see below). Another 
symptom is the influence of intellectual figures with no clear disciplinary identity 
whose work is influential across many disciplines. Among these are Louis Althusser, 
Judith Butler, Zygmunt Bauman, Manuel Castells, Michel Foucault, Nancy Fraser, 
Anthony Giddens, Stuart Hall, Donna Haraway, David Harvey, Jürgen Habermas, 
Ernesto Laclau, Karl Polanyi, Edward Said, Saskia Sassen, Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak, and Iris Marion Young. We can also note new forms of scholarship and the 
entry of new types of scholar into disciplines previously dominated by white, middle-
class, malestream theorizing from Europe and North America. Overall, these 
developments have generated multiple challenges to orthodox ontologies, 
epistemologies, and methodologies in individual disciplines.  
 
The second set of developments concerns the decline of 'area studies' and the rise 
of various new institutionalisms. Area studies originated in Eurocentric views of other 
civilizations and in classical imperialist expansionist interests; they grew after the 
Second World War largely in response to America's postwar security concerns and 
hegemonic pretensions. Comparative politics had already begun to challenge their 
fetishistic division of the world into distinct areas; vulgarized versions of globalization 
take this further with the idea that we live in one world. In this context variations on 
institutionalism (historical, economic, rational choice, sociological, ideational, etc) 
offer different routes to a unified approach to comparative analysis. In addition, the 
(re-)discovery of globalization (previously discussed in terms of the world market, the 
international division of labour, cultural imperialism, etc.) challenges the taken-for-
grantedness of national societies as units of analysis in most social science 
disciplines -- including sociology (national societies), politics (national states, public 
administration, and international relations), neo-classical economics (divided 
between micro- and macro-economics, with the latter equated with national 
economics and/or international trade), anthropology (concerned with 'primitive 
societies'), etc.. All of this has significant implications for political economy -- moving 
it away from traditional understandings of comparative politics and area studies.  
 The third set of developments concerns the emergence of new themes and problems 
that partly reflect the new approaches identified above, partly reflect real changes in 
political economy, and partly reflect new concerns among the sponsors and 
consumers of 'political economy' as a discipline. Among these themes and problems 
the most notable are globalization, governance, non-governmental organizations, 
networking, the knowledge-driven economy, the primacy of geo-economics over 
geo-politics, new forms of warfare, new forms of risk, environmental change, bodies 
and embodiment, and temporality and spatiality. We touch on some of these below. 
 
Is the study of political economy an interdisciplinary venture? 
 
Our short, and apparently paradoxical, answer to this question was indicated above. 
Whilst the origins of classical political economy were pre-disciplinary, contemporary 
political economy is becoming post-disciplinary. Early students of political economy 
were polymaths who wrote on economics, politics, civil society, language, morals, 
and philosophy (for example, Locke, Smith, Ferguson, Millar, Montesquieu, Hegel). 
They examined how wealth was produced and distributed and the close connection 
between these processes and modern state formation and inter-state relations. 
Later, political economy was separated into different disciplines: economics; politics, 
jurisprudence and public administration; and sociology and/or anthropology. These 
co-existed with history (typically sub-divided in terms of distinctive historical periods, 
areas, and places and borrowing many concepts from other branches of the 
humanities and social sciences) and with geography (which had an ambivalent 
identity and employed eclectic methods due to its position at the interface of nature 
and society and which was often prone to spatial fetishism). We are now witnessing 
the breakdown of these established disciplinary boundaries as well as the 
rediscovery of space and time as socially constructed, socially constitutive relations 
rather than mere external parameters of disciplinary inquiry. 
 
Which intellectual traditions are still pertinent to the analysis of the 
contemporary world? 
 
Our answer is again implied above. The most pertinent intellectual traditions to such 
an analysis are found among those that antedated disciplinary boundaries and/or 
refused to accept them. The most obvious of these, by virtue of its historical 
continuity and its impact in many disciplines, is Marxism -- although this is best 
considered as a family of approaches rather than a single unified system and has 
itself experienced recurrent crises and repeated re-invention. Its overall relevance 
derives from its ambition to provide a totalizing perspective on social relations as a 
whole in terms of the historically specific conditions of existence, dynamic, and 
repercussions of the social organization of production. In addition, it originated in a 
creative synthesis of German philosophy, classical English economics, and French 
politics and has remained open (in its non-sterilized, undogmatic variants) to other 
influences -- witness the impact at different times of psycho-analysis, linguistics, 
structuralism, post-structuralism, the ‘cultural turn’, feminism, nationalism, and post-
colonialism. Particularly important among Marxist developments in political economy 
in the last 25 years or so are the regulation approach and transnational historical 
materialism. The regulation approach is a variant of evolutionary and institutional 
economics that analyses the economy in its broadest sense as including both 
economic and extra-economic factors. It interprets the economy an ensemble of 
socially embedded, socially regularized, and strategically selective institutions, 
organizations, social forces, and actions organized around (or at least involved in) 
capitalist reproduction.3 Transnational historical materialism is even broader in 
scope.4 It is especially concerned with the international dimensions and 
interconnections of class formation, state formation, regime building, and social 
movements and is explicitly trans-disciplinary in approach as well as transnational in 
its substantive concerns.  
 
Another important pre-disciplinary intellectual tradition is the so-called Staats- or 
Polizeiwissenschaften (state or 'police' sciences) approach that developed in 19th 
century Germany and elsewhere in Europe and has recently been revived in the 
concern (whether Foucauldian or non-Foucauldian in inspiration) with governance 
and governmentality. Feminism is another recently re-invigorated tradition. It has had 
an increasing impact on questions, methods, and approaches in contemporary 
political economy both through its critiques of orthodox approaches, through its 
radical redefinition of the key topics in the field, and through its substantive studies. 
 In addition, new intellectual currents have emerged that are becoming increasingly 
pertinent to political economy. We will mention just four here. One is political 
ecology. This seeks to transcend the nature-society dichotomy and to provide a 
totalizing analysis of their structural coupling and co-constitution. Another is 
discourse analysis qua set of methods rather than a distinctive object of inquiry -- 
with various sub-specialisms (such as the narrative, rhetorical, argumentative, and 
linguistic turns). Particularly important for our purposes is its focus on the discursive 
constitution and regularization of both the capitalist economy and the national state 
as imagined entities and on their cultural as well as social embeddedness. Yet 
another current, less significant as yet in political economy but with obvious import 
for it, is 'queer theory'. This aims to subvert the heteronormative assumptions of 
feminism as well as malestream theory and stresses the ambivalence and instability 
of all identities and social entities.5 The fourth current is critical geo-politics and 
critical security studies. This applies various new intellectual currents to deconstruct 
and redefine the nature of international relations. Palan has recently grouped some 
of these emerging currents together under the rubric of 'post-rationalism' -- a trend 
that approximate what we ourselves term 'cultural political economy'.6 
 
We can counterpose such explicit pre-disciplinary revivals or post-disciplinary 
developments to attempts in some disciplines to establish their intellectual 
hegemony through conceptual and methodological imperialism. The most egregious 
example here is economics, with its attempt to model all behaviour in terms of the 
canonical economic man and rational, maximizing calculation. Less influential but 
still significant is the 'exorbitation of language' in discourse analysis à la Laclau and 
Mouffe, which analyses all social relations in terms of the metaphor of language. A 
more productive view is that discourse involves ‘both what is said and what is done, 
which breaks down the distinction between language (discourse in the narrow sense) 
and practice’.7 This enables the analyst to transcend the action/language distinction 
and to explore the complex 'discursive-material' nature of practices, organizations, 
and institutions. Nor is Marxism immune from its own imperialist tendencies. This is 
especially serious when it shifts from being one totalizing perspective among others 
to a claim to be able to interpret the world as a closed totality -- a claim aggravated 
when expressed in the form of one-sided theoretical deviations such as technological 
determinism, economism, class reductionism, politicism, ideologism, or voluntarism. 
Indeed no theoretical perspective is entirely innocent of such tendencies to push its 
theoretical horizons to the maximum and this can often prove productive within the 
continuing development of the social sciences. 
 
In this spirit we will use our limited space here to support two main arguments. The 
first concerns the continued relevance of Marxism as a pre-disciplinary intellectual 
tradition committed to the critique of political economy -- subject to certain 
modifications consistent with the overall Marxist tradition. The second concerns the 
significance of the post-disciplinary ‘cultural turn’ for rethinking political economy -- 
subject to certain modifications that re-assert the importance of the materiality of 
political economy as regards both its objects of analysis and its methods of inquiry. 
In our own particular cases, this involves a major convergence between traditional 
Marxism and the ‘cultural turn’ to produce a Marxist-inflected ‘cultural political 
economy’. But there are other ways to reinvigorate Marxism and/or to develop 
‘cultural political economy’ and we do not wish to be too prescriptive. So we will 




Marxism has experienced recurrent crises closely related to capitalism's surprising 
capacity for self-regeneration and socialism's equally surprising capacity for self-
defeat. Yet Marx's pioneering analysis still defines the insurpassable horizon for 
critical reflection on the political economy of capitalism. This does not mean that it is 
incontrovertibly true and cannot be improved -- far from it. Instead it means that 
Marx's critique of political economy is an obligatory reference point for any serious 
attempt to improve our understanding of the nature and dynamic of capitalism as an 
historically specific mode of production.8 This is nowhere clearer today than in 
Marxist analyses of the growth dynamic and crisis-tendencies of Atlantic Fordism, 
the re-scaling of economic and political relations, the logic -- and illogic -- of neo-
liberal globalization, the structural contradictions and strategic dilemmas of the so-
called knowledge-driven economy (or, as Castells' influential work defines it, 
informational capitalism),9 the restructuring of the Keynesian welfare national state 
and the tendential emergence of the Schumpeterian workfare post-national regime,10 
and the analysis of new forms of socialization of the relations of production 
corresponding to the new forces of production. Key concepts for this work of re-
invigoration include the contradictions inherent in the commodity as the 'cell form' of 
capitalism; the specificities of labour-power, money, land (or, better, the natural 
environment), and knowledge as fictitious commodities; the constitutive 
incompleteness of the capital relation, i.e., the inherent incapacity of capital to 
reproduce itself solely in and through exchange relations; the significance of spatio-
temporal fixes as socially-constructed institutional frameworks for displacing and 
deferring the contradictions and dilemmas of capital accumulation beyond their 
prevailing spatial boundaries and temporal fixes;11 and the overall importance of 
focusing on social relations, social practices, and emergent processes rather than on 
fixed, unchanging structures and their equally fixed, unchanging contradictions that 
function teleologically as the hidden hand of history. 
 
Making the ‘Cultural Turn’ in Political Economy 
 
The 'cultural turn' is best interpreted broadly and pluralistically. It covers approaches 
in terms of discourse, ideology, identity, narrativity, argumentation, rhetoric, 
historicity, reflexivity, hermeneutics, interpretation, semiotics, deconstruction, etc.. It 
is important to note here that discourse analysis and its cognates involve a generic 
methodology as well as the substantive fields of enquiry to which they have largely 
been applied. They are therefore as relevant to the investigation of the economic and 
political orders as they are to work on the so-called 'ideological' or 'cultural' 
phenomena. One key feature of the ‘cultural turn’ is its discursive account of power. 
This involves the claim that the interests at stake in relations of power are 
significantly shaped by the discursive constitution of identities, modes of calculation, 
strategies, and tactics and not just by the so-called 'objective' position of specific 
agents in a given conjuncture (as if they existed outside of discourse); and also that 
the primary institutional mechanisms in and through which power is exercised, 
whether directly or indirectly, themselves involve a variable mix of discursive and 
material resources. Another key feature, influenced both by Gramscian and 
Foucauldian analyses, is its emphasis on the social construction of knowledge and 
truth regimes. Both themes can be applied to political economy itself. Thus ‘cultural 
political economy’ can be said to involve a critical, self-reflexive approach to the 
definition and methods of political economy and to the inevitable contextuality and 
historicity of its claims to knowledge. It rejects any universalistic, positivist account of 
reality, denies the subject-object duality, allows for the co-constitution of subjects 
and objects, and eschews reductionist approaches to the discipline. However, in 
taking the ‘cultural turn’, political economy should continue to emphasize the 
materiality of social relations and the constraints involved in processes that also 
operate 'behind the backs' of the relevant agents. It can thereby escape the 
sociological imperialism of pure social constructionism and the voluntarist vacuity of 
certain lines of discourse analysis, which seem to imply that one can will anything 
into existence in and through an appropriately articulated discourse. ‘Cultural political 
economy’ should recognise the emergent extra-discursive features of social relations 
and their impact on capacities for action and transformation. 
 
An interesting example of the potential for ‘cultural political economy’ can be found in 
the recent work of the so-called 'Italian School'12 inspired by Robert Cox's 
appropriation of Gramscian concepts for analyses of international political economy. 
This school had a strong pluri-disciplinary perspective from the outset -- aiming to 
give equal analytical weight to production, institutions, and ideas and to develop rich 
historical analyses based on a variety of investigative methods. Cox himself 
examined how modes of production, structures of power, and ideological domination 
came to be articulated into more or less stable and coherent 'historical structures' or 
'historic blocs' that secure a 'fit' between these three sets of factors. He also argued 
that each historical structure was contradictory, contested, and liable to eventual 
break down.13 He provided a detailed account of the succession of relatively stable 
world orders under the hegemony (armoured, of course, by coercion) of particular 
national economies that benefit from their dominance in the most advanced 
production technologies and production regimes and that have also solved at least 
temporarily the problems associated with the preceding world order.14 Thus the 
'great transformation' produced by the hegemonic order of the postwar era emerged 
in response to the social conflict of the nineteenth century. The bourgeoisie 
consolidated its rule by developing a new hegemonic vision and gradually reshaping 
key national institutions to help them develop a cohesive culture based on production 
relations. It generalized its conception of social and political order to the international 
level to create an international system supportive of its profit and power interests. 
This involved creating partners abroad, controlling interest formation by influencing 
their domestic environments, and socializing them into the hegemonic worldview. 
Nonetheless such attempts to develop transnational hegemony are limited by 
domestic modes of production and emerging social forces outside the dominant 
social formation.15 Recent globalization trends in the world economy reflect a 
fundamental shift from the previously nation(al)-state-oriented mode of production 
towards a global economy and involve major redesign of the institutional architecture 
of states and international relations.16 
 
Most earlier Coxian analyses tended to prioritize the (material) power-institution side 
of this trialectic, and therefore, fell short of a more thorough Gramscian analysis in at 
least three ways: (a) over-privileging class over non-class identities and interests in 
the analysis of power and institutions; (b) under-examining ‘ideas’ (even the ideas 
central to economic hegemony and governance) -- seeing them in largely ideational 
terms rather than as both practical and discursive in nature, attributing their 
production primarily to intellectuals rather than exploring the complex articulation of 
folklore, popular common sense, specialized disciplines, science, and philosophy, 
and regarding them as relatively fixed rather than as inherently polysemic and 
unstable; and (c) largely ignoring the complex co-constitutive relationship among 
ideas, power and institutions in favour of a largely juxtapositional analysis of different 
factors that were often handled in ideal-typical terms.17 More recent work has begun 
to correct these problems in two ways: first, by adopting a more faithful Gramscian 
analysis and/or a taking a Foucauldian cultural turn in dealing with ideational issues; 
and, second, by providing a more rigorous analysis of the institutional mediations 
involved in the organization, articulation, and embedding of production and political 
domination. Thus Cox has recently incorporated ‘otherness’ into his work on 
civilizations;18 and has also discussed the new world order in terms of the ‘new 
medievalism’ -- ‘a multi-level system of political authorities with micro- and macro-
regionalisms and transborder identities interacting in a more complex political 
process’.19 Likewise, Gill has examined the ‘global panopticon’ and surveillance 
order of neo-liberalism;20 Sinclair has investigated bonds and debt-rating agencies 
as producers of financial knowledge;21 and Rupert has discussed the contested 
common sense in the USA.22 This shift suggests that Coxians are re-evaluating 
Gramsci’s arguments about ‘ideas’/culture and have taken the ‘cultural turn’.  
 Nonetheless, from our paradoxical pre- and post-disciplinary perspective, the Coxian 
School has failed to deliver its full potential. In addition to the problems in its initial 
ideal-typical analysis of modes of production and structures of domination and its 
tendency to separate the economic and political, it also failed to fully exploit 
Gramsci's pioneering analyses. For, if we recall that Gramsci himself saw hegemony 
as moral, intellectual, and political leadership even if it also required a decisive 
economic nucleus, this would require serious engagement with non-class identities 
(e.g., gender, race, ethnicity) and the distinctive practices involved in constructing 
hegemony on different scales. At stake here is the need to avoid short-circuiting 
one's analysis directly to classes as actors and to concentrate instead on how 
identities, interests, and social movements acquire class relevance and how this 
might be assessed. In short, the real problem for the early Coxian school is how a 
class relevant project (e.g., neo-liberalism) is assembled in ‘material-discursive’ 
space and how it is reproduced (not mechanistically) within the wider society despite 
its reliance on an inherently unstable equilibrium of compromise and the pressures to 
which it is subjected. To this we might add the neglect of the discursive constitution 
of the economy as an object of economic regulation and of the discursive 
constitution of the political imaginary in and around which particular political regimes 
are stabilised. In both cases this involves not only the demarcation and differential 
articulation of specific institutions (e.g., distributing them across 'economic'-'extra-
economic' or 'public'-'private' divides) but also the constitution of specific subject 
positions and their differential articulation with other identities (e.g., workers or 
citizens with diverse gender, ethnic, 'racial', or regional identities). Building on this 
example, we now present a research agenda in and for ‘cultural political economy’. 
 
On ‘Cultural Political Economy’ 
 
The ‘cultural turn’ in political economy can be translated into at least five interrelated 
research injunctions: (a) take the argumentative, narrative, rhetorical, and linguistic 
turns seriously in the analysis of political economy, either as the principal method of 
analysis or as adjuncts to other methods of inquiry; (b) examine the role of discourse 
in the making and re-making of social relations and its contribution to their emergent 
extra-discursive properties; (c) investigate discourses and discursive configurations 
as a system of meanings and practices that has semiotic structuring effects that 
differ from those of emergent political and economic structures and, a fortiori, study 
how these different principles or logics interact and with what effects; (d) focus on 
the (in)stability and the interplay of objects-subjects in the remaking of social 
relations -- and hence the importance of remaking subjectivities as part of the 
structural transformation and actualization of objects; and (e) examine the 
relationship between the politics of identity/difference and political economy - 
especially the complex articulations between class and non-class identities over 
different times and spaces. Pursuing these themes should enable political economy 
to become more self-reflexive epistemologically and methodologically and to 
broaden its traditional, structuralist research agenda. 
 
Perhaps the most important role for the ‘cultural turn’ is to critique the distinction 
between the economic and the political on which most work in political economy is 
premised. Some Marxist theorists consider the distinction between the economic and 
the political as nothing more than an illusory, fetishized reflection of the 'separation-
in-unity' of the capital relation.23 Although we reject this essentialist position, we do 
share its insight that the cultural and social construction of boundaries between the 
economic and political has major implications for the forms and effectiveness of the 
articulation of market forces and state intervention in reproducing and regularizing 
capitalism. Thus we suggest that, within the totality of economic relations, specific 
economies be seen as imaginatively narrated systems that are accorded specific 
boundaries, conditions of existence, typical economic agents, tendencies and 
countertendencies, and a distinctive overall dynamic. Among relevant phenomena 
here are technoeconomic paradigms, norms of production and consumption, specific 
models of development, accumulation strategies, societal paradigms, and the 
broader organizational and institutional narratives and/or metanarratives that provide 
the general context (or 'web of interlocution') in which these make sense.24 
Accordingly, rather than seek objective criteria to identify the necessary boundaries 
of economic space (on whatever territorial or functional scale), it is more fruitful to 
pose this issue in terms of an imaginary constitution (and naturalization) of the 
economy. This always occurs in and through struggles conducted by specific agents, 
typically involves the manipulation of power and knowledge, and is liable to 
contestation and resistance. The state system can likewise be treated as an 
imagined political community with its own specific boundaries, conditions of 
existence, political subjects, developmental tendencies, sources of legitimacy, and 
state projects.25 Moreover, building on these arguments, we can also study how 
struggles over the definition of the boundaries between the economic and the extra-
economic (including the political) are central to the economic restructuring and the 
transformation of the state and state intervention.26  
 
Another major theme in ‘cultural political economy’ concerns the constitution of its 
subjects and their modes of calculation. This is a field where the ‘cultural turn’ has its 
most distinctive contribution to make in rounding out Marxism and critiquing other 
approaches within contemporary political economy. For political economy in general 
has an impoverished notion of how subjects and subjectivities are formed and how 
different modes of calculation emerge and become institutionalized. Marxism has 
always had problems in this regard due to its prioritization of class (most egregiously 
so in the unacceptable reductionist claim that there is a natural movement from 
objective 'class in itself' to subjective 'class for itself').27  But rational choice theories, 
which have become increasingly dominant in contemporary political economy, are no 
better: they simply naturalize one version of rationality and show no interest in the 
formation of different subjects and modes of calculation. These problems are 
especially relevant, of course, to the emergence of new subjects and social forces in 
political economy -- an issue related closely (but not exclusively) to periods of crisis 
and struggles over how to respond thereto.28 More generally, a ‘cultural political 
economy’ approach means that interests cannot be taken as given independently of 
the discursive constitution of particular subject positions and the modes of 
calculation from which their interests are calculated in specific material-discursive 
conjunctures.  
 
Building on these two research themes, a third area for ‘cultural political economy’ 
would be the analysis of how different subjects, subjectivities, and modes of 
calculation come to be naturalized and materially implicated in everyday life and, 
perhaps, articulated to form a relatively stable hegemonic order (or, alternatively, are 
mobilized to undermine it). This is an area where Gramsci still has a particular 
relevance but where his contribution must be reconstructed in sympathetic 
opposition to his over-simplified appropriation in the Italian School. In this way a 
‘cultural political economy’ can develop and articulate the micro-foundations of 
political economy with its macro-structuring principles in an overall material-
discursive analysis without resorting to the unsatisfactory, eclectic, and incoherent 
combination of rational choice theory and institutionalism that is still too often 
advocated as a 'way out' of the impasse of political economy. The key to such a 
cultural political economic analysis would be a reciprocal analytical movement 
between the micro through the meso to the macro and back again. Thus one could 
show the linkages between personal identities and narratives to wider cultural and 
institutional formations that provide both 'a web of interlocution'29 and a strategically 
selective institutional materiality.30 One could also demonstrate their connection to 
larger meta-narratives that reveal links between a wide range of interactions, 
organizations, and institutions or help to make sense of whole epochs;31 and to the 
complex spatio-temporal fixes (such as that associated with Atlantic Fordism) that 
institutionalize particular spatialities and temporalities as inherent material-discursive 
properties of individual and organizational routines and that define the spatial and 
temporal horizons within which action is oriented.32 In short, adopting a ‘cultural 
political economy’ perspective will facilitate research into the conjunction and 
disjunction of micro-, meso-, and macro-level analyses in both discursive and 
material terms. 
 
To illustrate these arguments, we briefly consider the rise of neo-liberalism. Even if 
one accepted that the framework of a hegemonic order is largely determined by 
material forces, this order must still be narrated and rendered meaningful by and/or 
to actors located at key sites for its reproduction. For economic agents do not merely 
submit to the abstract category of ‘market’ or the 'dull compulsion of economic 
relations'. Their economic world is rich in contested meanings regarding what 
constitutes the ‘market/state’, ‘private/public’, ‘competitiveness’ etc., and the rules 
and conventions according to which they should operate. The current neo-liberal 
hegemonic order and its associated symbols (e.g., freedom of choice) and practices 
(e.g., privatization, deregulation, individualism, flexibility, globalization) have become 
meaningful and partially legitimated in and through particular representational 
practices in diverse sites in production, exchange, and finance. In finance, ‘market-
based monetary rationalities’ and practices are constructed in different domains and 
in a wide range of texts by international institutions such as the IMF, BIS, and credit 
agencies as well as by local(ized) actors, such as bank managers, market analysts, 
and lay investors. A new market-friendly 'common sense' has been constructed in 
and through research reports, official statistical interpretations, speeches, policy 
documents, laws, business press, investors’ chronicles, indices, popular economic 
literature, management courses/theories, etc. These different discourses may then 
become sedimented to form an ensemble of discursive practices that reconfigure 
subjects and subjectivities, conduct and institutions and generate a new ‘common 
sense’ that gets selected and repeated as the preferred ‘reality’ (or regime of truth) in 
different sites. 33  This ‘reality’ is typically associated with a specific order of spatial 
and temporal horizons of action (e.g., production for the ‘world market’/ finance as a 
‘space of flows’) and condensed into specific institutional ensembles with distinct 
spatialities and temporalities that differentially reconfigure structural constraints and 
conjunctural opportunities and privilege some strategies and tactics over others. 
Finally, we should note that such discursive practices are always contestable and 
open to the play of agency (hence also resistance). In the case of neo-liberalism, for 
example, this is evident in the attempts of (class and non-class) actors to inflect or 
transform these dominant codes. This occurs through the circulation of alternative 
reports, shadow publications, critical e-mail circulars, independent protest 
meetings/slogans, etc., that challenge the dominant ‘common sense’; as well as in 
more direct forms of resistance in factories, offices, social movements, and riots. 
Thus, a cultural approach reveals the multiple sites/levels in which class-relevant 
projects such as ‘neo-liberalism’ are assembled and contested in material-discursive 
space; and how its hegemony is reproduced (not mechanistically) despite its reliance 
on an inherently unstable equilibrium of compromise and the pressures to which it is 
subjected.  
 
In short, a research agenda based on a cultural approach to political economy 
involves addressing the following questions: (a) how are objects of economic 
regulation and governance constituted in specific conjunctures and how do they 
become hegemonic despite the inevitable tendencies towards instability and fluidity 
in social relations; (b) how are the actors/institutions and their modes of calculation 
constituted and how do they interact to produce these objects in both discursive and 
extra-discursive fields of action; (c) what are the specific discursive practices (e.g., 
hierarchization, exclusion/inclusion) and structuring principles involved in 
consolidating the narrative and non-narrative discourses that (re-)position subjects 
and identities, articulate power and knowledge, institutionalize truth regimes, and 
materialize power relations in specific institutional contexts; (d) how do counter-
hegemonic forces challenge routinized categories and naturalized institutions, 
generate new subject positions and social forces, and struggle for new projects and 
strategies; and (e) how are diverse forces continually balanced and counter-
balanced in an unstable equilibrium of compromise within specific spatio-temporal 





Our answers to the three key questions posed to us are as follows. First, the most 
exciting developments in the study of contemporary political economy involve the 
revival of pre-disciplinary approaches such as Marxism and the rise of post-
disciplinary approaches such as ‘cultural studies’, which, when applied to political 
economy, opens a space for ‘cultural political economy’. Second, the study of 
political economy became a disciplinary venture in the course of the consolidation of 
the institutional separation of the market economy, the national state based on the 
rule of law, and the emergence of civil society and the public sphere. The limitations 
of these fetishized distinctions always made the most provocative work in political 
economy interdisciplinary in the sense of drawing on the best work from different 
disciplines, especially in concrete-complex analyses. But we are now witnessing the 
emergence of a post-disciplinary approach that reflects the crisis in the received 
categories of analysis and the disciplines that correspond to them. And, third, the 
intellectual tradition that remains most pertinent to contemporary world is Marxism 
together with other species of institutional and evolutionary political economy that 
take institutions seriously and start from the assumption that the economic and extra-
economic are intimately inter-related and co-constitutive. But this tradition can be 
made even more fruitful through its creative synthesis with other pre- or post-
disciplinary traditions such as political ecology and feminism (or queer theory) 
provided that its primary concern with the materiality of capitalism, its structural 
contradictions, and its associated strategic dilemmas is maintained. 
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